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Deme et al. (2005, DFN) present a general equilibrium model for the case
of Lesotho with a rising step skill acquisition function. DFN show that only
a large amount of government expenditure on education, training and skill
acquisition can pull the economy out of its inertia. As a comment on DFN,
Bandopadhyay (2006) develops a similar general equilibrium model and ana-
lyzes the impact of government expenditure on skill acquisition. He ﬁnds that
the outcome on the economy is independent of the amount of the government
spending. By comparing the two models I show, that Bandopadhyay’s ﬁnd-
ings replicate one aspect of the ﬁndings of DFN and do not add additional
insight to the discussion.
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i1 Introduction
As a comment on Deme, Franck and Naqvi (2005, DFN), Bandopadhyay (2006) devel-
ops a general equilibrium model for a small economy with skilled and unskilled labor.
Bandopadhyay argues that an impact of increasing education expenditure by the gov-
ernment can be independent of the amount of this spending. By assuming a three sector
economy with world-given prices, he presents a general equilibrium model and analyzes
the impact of government expenditure on education, training and skill acquisition on
the economy. He ﬁnds that, ﬁrst, an increase in expenditure by the government leads
towards a larger amount of skilled labor and, second, to structural changes in the three
sectors. His model builds on the ﬁndings of DFN, who develop a general equilibrium
model for the case of Lesotho. In DFN’s model, Lesotho is modeled as a small open
economy with skilled and unskilled labor and a rising step skill acquisition function.
The consequence of this speciﬁc skill acquisition modeling is that only a large increase
of government expenditure on training and education can pull Lesotho out of its poverty
trap: a small increase cannot pull the economy out of its inertia.
My aim is to demonstrate that Bandopadhyay’s ﬁndings are identical to one aspect
described in DFN’s model and do not develop the original equilibrium model any fur-
ther. First, I introduce the model of DFN. Then, I outline the model presented by
Bandopadhyay. Eventually, by elaborating the correspondence between these two mod-
els, I show that the ﬁndings of Bandopadhyay can be regarded as already analyzed in
the paper of DFN and do not add any further insights to the discussion.
2 The Lesotho Equilibrium Model of Deme, Franck
and Naqvi
DFN present a general equilibrium model and apply it to the case of Lesotho. They
model Lesotho as a small open economy with perfect capital mobility in and out of
the economy and two forms of labor: skilled labor and unskilled labor. Skilled labor is
engaged only in the formal sector. Unskilled workers are engaged in the informal sector,
and their productivity is described by the eﬃciency-wage hypothesis. Some of the un-
skilled workers are also employed in the gold mines of South Africa and transfer parts
of their income as remittances back to Lesotho. Both domestic sectors can employ do-
mestic and foreign capital and their production functions are concave and homogeneous
1of degree one in both labor and capital. There exists a high unemployment rate and
an immense supply of unskilled labor. Thus, the wage of an unskilled worker is close to
zero.
For transforming an unskilled worker into a skilled worker, large doses of scarce resources
have to be employed. For instance, a new school requires a certain amount of investment.
Besides that, the labor market considers a person to be skilled only after attending
the tenth grade: investing in school education, but beneath the tenth grade, does not
transform a person into a skilled worker (DFN, 2005, p. 10). Due to these discontinuities
in the skill acquisition process, there is a high shortage of skilled workers. The formal
sector, which is the consumer of skilled labor, does not invest in education: ’the social
rate of return on investment in education and training is greater than the private return’
(see DFN, 2005, p. 4). Investing in education has positive externalities and could pull
the economy out of its inertia by satisfying the immense demand for skilled workers.
However, no competitive entrepreneur invests in training. DFN model this discontinuity
of the skill acquisition process through a discontinuous step function of skill acquisition,
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Figure 1: Skill Acquisition Process: ﬁgure adopted from DFN.
The ﬁgure shows the amount of skilled labor in Lesotho, S, depending on the amount of
public expenditure ǫ on skill acquisition, training and education. With any amount of
spending below ǫ2, the skill acquisition function is a rising step function. DFN represent
the discontinuities of the skill acquisition process mentioned above by adopting this
kind of function. To be employable in the formal sector, a tenth grade education is
necessary. Any expenditure on education that leads toward a higher qualiﬁcation, but
below the tenth grade standard, does not pull the economy out of the poverty trap. An
increase in public expenditure on skill acquisition from ǫ0 to ¯ ǫ does not enhance the
amount of skilled workers S1 in the economy; the GNP of the economy does not change
2and the unemployment rate does not diminish. On the other hand, with an increase in
expenditure from ¯ ǫ to ¯ ¯ ǫ a higher level of skilled workers is reached (from S1 to S2), the
unemployment rate decreases, the GNP increases. However, the expenditure level on
education is beneath ǫ2, and the economy is still in a condition of inertia and depends
on further public spending on education and skill acquisition.
As soon as the public expenditure on training and skill acquisition reaches the amount of
ǫ2, the social rate of return on investment in education approximately equals the private
rate of return. The positive external eﬀect of investing in education vanishes. Both
forms of investment - public and private spending on skill acquisition - become perfect
substitutes. Thus, past ǫ2, the skill acquisition function becomes a smoothly rising and
diﬀerentiable function ψ(ǫ+π). The derivative of this function is positive in both public
expenditure and private expenditure. In the case of ǫ ≥ ǫ2 the formal sector expands,
the informal sector contracts. The economy overcomes its inertia and moves toward a
full employment equilibrium.
3 The Equilibrium Model of Bandopadhyay
Bandopadhyay (2006) analyzes the impact of an increase in government expenditure
on education and skill acquisition on the economy. He argues that, contrary to DFN’s
model, an impact of expenditure on education and skill acquisition is independent of the
amount of this spending.
Bandopadhyay (2006) presents a general equilibrium model to explore the eﬀect of an
increase in government expenditure on education and training on the economy. He
analyzes an expanded model of the economy presented by Harris and Todaro (1970)
with three sectors: the urban formal sector, the urban informal sector and the rural
sector. The input factors in the economy are skilled and unskilled labor. Capital is fully
employed and perfectly mobile between the three sectors, but not internationally.
All three sectors employ capital and unskilled labor for their production. The urban
formal sector and the urban informal sector additionally require skilled labor for their
production. Every sector produces a commodity with a production technology, which
leads to a production function that is concave and homogeneous of degree one in every
argument. The prices of each commodity are given exogenously by the world and equal
the costs of production in a competitive equilibrium.
3In this model skills are gained through apprenticeship training. Only the urban informal
sector oﬀers apprenticeship training for unskilled workers. These apprentices are engaged
as unskilled workers during their training while acquiring skills. After the training
period, unskilled workers become skilled workers and are employable either in the urban
formal sector or in the urban informal sector. Thus, skilled labor is fully mobile between
the urban formal and the urban informal sector: there exists one wage rate for every
skilled worker. There is a severe shortage of skilled workers and a high unemployment
rate. In the model of Bandopadhyay (2006), no unemployment exists among the skilled
labor force.
Bandopadhyay models the skill acquisition process as an eﬀort function depending on
the net income of the apprentices, which is the diﬀerence between the wage during the
apprenticeship and the fee an apprentice has to pay for attending the training. That is,
the level of skills acquired by the apprentices is determined by the costs of the training:
there is an eﬃciency net income at which additional costs of further training equal the
beneﬁts brought along by the increase of skills. Although there is a high demand for
skilled workers and apprenticeship training, the fee for attending the apprenticeship
cannot be raised to fulﬁll the demand for apprenticeship places, because this would
lower the skills to an ineﬃcient level. In this way, Bandopadhyay presents the reason for
unemployment and the unsatisﬁed demand for skilled workers. Later, Bandopadhyay
(2006, p. 5) describes the amount of apprentices as a function depending not only on
the net income but also on an additional argument: the government expenditure on
education, training and skill acquisition. He states that the derivative of the amount
of skilled workers with respect to both net income wage and government expenditure is
positive.
The proposition of Bandopadhyay (2006) is that increased government expenditure on
education, training and skill acquisition leads towards an expansion in the urban formal
sector in both engaged labor and capital. By solving his model, he ﬁnds further conse-
quences, independent of the amount of the expenditure on skill acquisition: a decrease in
unemployment, and a decrease in the urban informal and the rural sector in employment
and capital.
44 Comparison and Conclusion
DFN and Bandopadhyay analyze the impact of spending on skill acquisition and educa-
tion on an economy. Their models diﬀer in some aspects: DFN analyze a fully opened
two sector economy with some workers being engaged in another sector outside of the
economy; Bandopadhyay presents a three sector economy with no international capital
mobility. The main diﬀerence between the two models with regard to this comment is
the way unskilled workers acquire skills and become skilled workers: DFN model a skill
acquisition process outside of the sectors of the economy. For instance, by investing into
education beyond the tenth grade of school, a person becomes a skilled worker. Below
a certain level of public expenditure ǫ2 on education, the consumers of skilled labor in
their model do not provide any educational training. This is due to a low private return
on investment in skill acquisition compared to the social return. On the other hand,
Bandopadhyay models skill acquisition as a process realized during an apprenticeship
training, which is conducted by the informal sector. The eﬃciency wage hypothesis
holds for the amount of acquired skills. Additionally, the government can also transform
unskilled into skilled workers by expenditure on education, training and skill acquisition.
Both analyze, how the economy can get out of the poverty trap through government
expenditure on education. DFN’s ﬁndings show that, a large amount has to be spent
on education, while a smaller amount of expenditure has little or no eﬀect at all. They
model the institutional characteristics of the labor market as a rising step skill acquisition
function. Bandopadhyay argues, that the same eﬀects on the economy can be achieved
irrespectively of the amount of the expenditure on education and skill acquisition. He
considers these ﬁndings to be independent of the amount of government expenditure
and as well irrespective of the appearance of the skill acquisition function. However, his
results are based on the characteristics of the supply function of skilled labor La, which
he has formulated as:







where E is the amount of government expenditure on education, training and skill
acquisition, Wa is the gross income and e is the fee that is paid to the apprentice trainer.
As the skilled labor supply function is derivable, and the derivative is positive, the
labor supply function has to be both continuous and strictly increasing with respect to
5the net income of the apprentices and the government expenditure. Thus, the results of
Bandopadhyay are only consistent with this special form of the skill acquisition function:
after an increase in government expenditure on training, no increase in skilled labor
occurs and the urban formal sector does not expand, if equation (2) is not given.
This observation is one aspect of DFN’s ﬁndings: if government expenditure on skill
acquisition is large enough (higher than ǫ2 with regard to Figure 1), the same results as
Bandopadhyay’s occur. Beyond that amount of government expenditure, the economy
breaks out of its inertia. Private expenditure on skill acquisition becomes a substitute
for public expenditure on education and skill acquisition. It is irrelevant for the results,
whether skill acquisition is realized in school according to the model of DFN, or during an
apprenticeship training, according to Bandopadhyay. This corresponds to the equation
(2) above and is the case, if government expenditure on skill acquisition and private
expenditure are substitutes.
Bandopadhyay analyzes a part of DFN’s economy, with some diﬀerences in the model
that do not add any diﬀerences to the results. By not taking into account any rigidities
of the labor market, he describes the situation above expenditure of ǫ2, and with ǫ2 =
0. This case is already discussed by DFN, as well as the situation with labor market
rigidities for ǫ2  = 0. Thus, Bandopadhyay adds no additional insights to the discussion.
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